Firms which don’t meet our minimum standards put consumers at risk. They also undermine trust in financial services and markets. We tracked 2 outcomes on dealing with problem firms using 5 metrics. In addition, we set 3 operational metrics to reflect our intended step change in the way we dealt with these firms. This included improving our data-led capabilities to proactively detect problem firms and new cancellation powers to act quickly.
Confidence
Outcome 1: Consumers and market participants have confidence that financial services firms which fail to meet the Threshold conditions and/or should otherwise not be regulated, are identified and cancelled quickly
| Metric code | Metric description | Source | Baseline Value | Year 1 values | Year 2 values | Year 3 values | Latest status (year 3 value compared to baseline) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DPF1-M01 | Maintain awareness of, and increase perceived effectiveness of, FCA enforcement action on Threshold conditions
As a relatively high proportion of firms are familiar with FCA threshold conditions we are looking to maintain awareness, rather than increase it, and have adjusted the description of this metric to show this.
| FCA and Practitioner Panel survey
| Extent to which firms are familiar with FCA Threshold conditions: Very/fairly familiar 94% Not very/not at all familiar 5% Don’t know 1% (2022/23) | N/A | Very/fairly familiar 94% Not very/not at all familiar 5% Don’t know 1% (2023/24) | Very/fairly familiar 95% Not very/not at all familiar 4% Don’t know 1% (2024/25) Difference between year 3 and baseline value is statistically significant | Improved |
Extent to which firms agree that firms who fail to meet Threshold conditions are identified promptly and their status withdrawn where appropriate Agree or Strongly Agree 53% Neither agree nor disagree 24% Disagree or strongly disagree 4% Don’t know 19% (2022/23)
| N/A | Values for year 2 not available due to an error in data collection. | Agree or Strongly Agree 53% Neither agree nor disagree 26% Disagree or strongly disagree 5% Don’t know 16% (2024/25) Difference between year 3 and baseline value is not statistically significant for 'agree and strongly agree', 'neither agree or disagree' or 'disagree or strongly disagree' | Little or no change | |||
| DPF1-M02 | Increase in number of cancellations and withdrawals of permissions over 3 years This is to reflect an increase in our effort to intervene when firms do not meet the Threshold conditions or should otherwise not be regulated | FCA data | 480 cancellations and withdrawals of permissions (2021) | 627 cancellations and withdrawals of permissions (2022)
| 1,261 cancellations and withdrawals of permissions (2023)
| 1,516 cancellations and withdrawals of permissions (2024) | Improved |
Outcome 2: Consumers and market participants trust that the FCA intervenes to stop harm to consumers and market integrity quickly
| Metric code | Metric description | Source | Baseline Value | Year 1 values | Year 2 values | Year 3 values | Latest status (year 3 value compared to baseline) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DPF2-M01 | Increase in awareness of, and perceived effectiveness of, FCA interventions | FCA and Practitioner Panel survey
| Extent to which firms agree that the FCA is quick to intervene to stop potential harm within the industry: Agree or Strongly Agree 50% Neither agree nor disagree 28% Disagree or strongly disagree 13% Don’t know 9% (2022/23) | N/A | Values for year 2 not available due to an error in data collection. | Agree or Strongly Agree 52% Neither agree nor disagree 28% Disagree or strongly disagree 13% Don’t know 7% (2024/25) Difference between year 3 and baseline value is statistically significant for 'agree or strongly agree'. | Improved |
Proportion of firms aware of the FCA withdrawing permissions from any firms or individuals 55% (2021) | 71% (2022/23) | 78% (2023/24) | 80% (2024/25) Difference between year 3 and baseline value is statistically significant. | Improved | |||
| DPF2-M02 | Reduction in time between identification of firm causing serious harm and decision on use of intervention tool*
| FCA data | 25% of interventions took less than 17 business days; 75% took less than 96 business days; with the median* being 44 business days from identification of serious harm to taking action using the following tools: Own Initiative Requirements/ Own Initiative Variation of Permissions/ Voluntary Requirements/Voluntary Variation of Permissions/Own Initiative Variation of Approved Person (2023) | 25% of interventions took less than 14 business days; 75% took less than 74 business days; with the median being 33 business days from identification of serious harm to taking action using the following tools: Own Initiative Requirements/ Own Initiative Variation of Permissions/ Voluntary Requirements/Voluntary Variation of Permissions/Own Initiative Variation of Approved Person (2024) | Improved | ||
| DPF2-M03 | Increase in use of intervention tools following identification of firm causing serious harm | FCA data | Own Initiative Requirements/ Own Initiative Variation of Permissions– 25 (2021) | Own Initiative Requirements/ Own Initiative Variation of Permissions – 19 (2022) | Own Initiative Requirements/ Own Initiative Variation of Permissions – 34 (2023) At least the following additional FCA Interventions tools (see below)
(July 2023 – March 2024) | Own Initiative Requirements/ Own Initiative Variation of Permissions – 12 (2024) At least the following additional FCA Interventions tools (see below)
(April 2024 – March 2025) | Little or no change |
What the latest metric values tell us
In the past 3 years we made substantial progress against problem firms. We improved our processes, using data and innovative technology to reduce and prevent harm.
We enhanced our response to firms that fail to meet our Threshold Conditions. We cancelled 1,516 firms’ authorisations in 2024. That's 20% more than 2023, and triple that of 2021. This helped consumers and firms trust in our ability to take action. It also built confidence to transact with those firms who can meet our standards.
We’ve delivered impactful interventions over the course of the 3-year strategy. We intervened on over 350 occasions in the final year. Our focus on earlier, effective communication meant more firms were willing to fix issues voluntarily. This reduced our need to use own-initiative intervention powers compared to previous years. Stopping these firms reduces risk to consumers and strengthens trust in financial services.